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In this paper, we investigate how the dynamic eﬀects of excess liquidity shocks on
economic activity, asset prices and inﬂation diﬀer over time. We show that the impact
varies considerably over time, depends on the source of increased liquidity (M1, M3-M1
or credit) and the underlying state of the economy (asset price boom-bust, business
cycle, inﬂation cycle, credit cycle and monetary policy stance).
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
To achieve its primary objective of price stability, the European Central Bank (ECB)
uses a strategy based on two "pillars". One of these pillars, referred to as the mone-
tary analysis, exploits the long-run link between money and inﬂation. In particular, to
signal its commitment to price stability and to provide a benchmark for the assessment
of monetary developments, the ECB announces a reference value for the growth rate of
the broad monetary aggregate M3. This prominent role assigned to money has been sub-
ject to intense criticism from the very beginning. Besides theoretical motivations for not
considering monetary aggregates (e.g. Galí 2003, Woodford 2007), it has been frequently
argued that money might be an unreliable indicator in an environment of low inﬂation
(e.g. Estrella and Mishkin 1997, De Grauwe and Polan 2005). Since the introduction of
the euro, the annual growth rate of M3 has almost continuously been above its reference
value of 4.5% without a corresponding tightening of monetary policy or an acceleration
of inﬂation, which supports doubts about the usefulness of money aggregates as an indi-
cator of risks to price stability. The ECB claims, however, that the analysis of monetary
developments goes well beyond the assessment of M3 growth in relation to its reference
value. The monetary analysis uses a comprehensive assessment of the liquidity situation
based on information about the balance sheet context as well as the composition of M3
growth (ECB 2004). It is intended to shed light on the outlook for price stability and the
implications for monetary policy eschewing a mechanical policy response to a monetary
aggregate.1 For instance, the Governing Council has repeatedly stated that some episodes
of rapid money growth were due to special factors and shifts in the demand for money
arising from e.g. portfolio shifts or changes in the opportunity cost of holding money.
As a consequence, such episodes were disregarded and not considered as signalling risks
to price stability. On the other hand, there were cases where excess money growth did
warrant a tightening of policy, especially when combined with information obtained from
the other pillar of ECB’s monetary policy strategy, the economic analysis (Gerlach 2007).
This illustrates that the link between excess money growth or excess liquidity and future
inﬂation is probably not constant over time and depends on other factors as well, such as
t h es o u r c eo fi n c r e a s e dl i q u i d i t ya nd general economic conditions.
In defense of its two-pillar strategy, the ECB also often argues that asset price bubbles
could be the result of strong and persistent growth in money and credit aggregates. Since
developments of asset prices not in line with fundamentals are not captured by a pure in-
1See also Fischer et al. (2008) for a detailed narrative approach about the role of money in the monetary
policy decisions of the ECB and how it has evolved over time.
2ﬂation forecast, they do not trigger a policy reaction in a traditional Taylor rule framework
(Issing 2002).2 A detailed monetary analysis could therefore provide early information on
emerging ﬁnancial imbalances which could have destabilizing eﬀects on economic activity
and inﬂation. Detken and Smets (2004) indeed show that high-cost booms in asset prices
often follow rapid growth in money and credit stocks just before and at an early stage of
the boom. Since ﬁnancial assets are growing in importance and hence, asset price ﬂuc-
tuations increasingly aﬀect the economy, monetary policy could be improved by taking
account of the evolution of money and credit aggregates as a signal of ﬁnancial imbalances
(Hildebrand 2008). There are obviously also episodes in history during which money, tem-
porarily growing out of line with fundamentals, did not coincide with asset price bubbles.
Accordingly, the information for asset prices contained in these indicators may also vary
over time and this suggests that the weight assigned by a central bank to the monetary
analysis should be state dependent (Issing 2002).
In this paper, we focus more extensively on the complex link between money, economic
activity, asset prices and inﬂation. In particular, we investigate the impact of liquidity
shocks in a time-varying and state-dependent framework for the Euro area economy. Ex-
cess liquidity is identiﬁed as the deviation of broad money from an equilibrium value in a
structural VAR. We ﬁrst estimate the impact of a shock to liquidity on a set of macroeco-
nomic variables and asset prices within the VAR framework. This shock has a temporary
eﬀect on economic activity and a permanent impact on the price level which is less than
proportional. Increased liquidity also creates temporary rises in real equity, property and
aggregate asset prices. The economic consequences and the magnitude of the impact how-
ever depend heavily on the underlying source of increased liquidity. A 1 percent long-run
increase in M1 has a considerable impact on economic activity, asset prices and inﬂation.
The impact on inﬂation is even proportional. In contrast, a shock in M3-M1 has only
minor economic consequences and results more in a permanent long-run increase in the
real money stock. We observe that shocks to credit, which is the counterpart of the broad
monetary aggregate, have rather similar eﬀects as shocks in M3. Using a simple sample
split and more sophisticated Bayesian VARs with time-varying parameters, we also ﬁnd
considerable variation in the dynamic responses over time. On the one hand, inﬂationary
consequences of a liquidity shock are much weaker since the mid-eighties resulting also
in a more permanent shift of real money. In more recent times, however, there seems
again to be a tendency for an increased impact on inﬂation. On the other hand, time
2Theoretical support is provided by Christiano et al. (2006) who show that when an inﬂation-targeting
central bank and sticky nominal wages are introduced in a standard real business cycle model, a theory of
boom-busts emerges naturally, i.e. boom-bust episodes are correlated with strong credit growth.
3variation with respect to the eﬀect on output and asset prices is less clear. We ﬁnd in-
creased responsiveness during some periods but decreased reactions at other points in
time. This is not surprising given the growing theoretical and empirical literature (as
discussed below and in section 4) that argues that the macroeconomic impact depends on
the state of the economy, e.g. asset price boom-busts, credit booms, the business cycle
or the monetary policy stance. The ﬁnal part of the paper analyses this in more detail.
More speciﬁcally, we estimate the impact of excess liquidity shocks in a single-equation
approach allowing the coeﬃcients to diﬀer depending on the state of the economy. We
ﬁnd evidence that liquidity shocks have a stronger impact on economic activity and asset
prices during asset price booms and busts, at times of credit booms (which are a proxy
for ﬁnancial innovations) and, to a lesser extent, during periods of tight monetary policy.
Negative shocks to liquidity also exert stronger eﬀects on real activity and asset prices
than positive ones. While real property prices are much more sensitive to excess liquidity
when economic growth is above its trend value, the reaction of output is stronger dur-
ing recessions. On the other hand, inﬂationary eﬀects are greater during boom phases
of asset prices, economic expansions and credit booms, but smaller when the monetary
policy stance is restrictive. In sum, the impact heavily depends on the underlying state
of the economy. The estimated diﬀerences are also economically important. The reaction
of real asset prices to a liquidity shock during an asset price boom is, for instance, three
times larger than the average estimated reaction for the whole sample period. Similar
conclusions can be drawn for inﬂation and output growth.
Our paper is linked to several strands of the economic literature. First, some studies
ﬁnd distortions over time of the link between money aggregates and inﬂation for the Euro
area. For instance, Gerlach (2004) shows that the information content of money growth
for future inﬂa t i o ni nt h eE u r oa r e ad i ﬀers across sub-periods. Also Hofmann (2006) ﬁnds
a break in the forecasting performance of M3 in the early years of EMU. Our results show
that these deteriorations over time could be due to changes in the growth of the underlying
components of broad money, i.e. M1 or M3-M1, or the accompanying state of the economy.
Second, several recent studies have discussed the relationship between liquidity and asset
prices. In particular, the exact relation could be dependent on the state of some economic
variables. One important element of the discussion is to what extent potentially harmful
asset price boom-bust episodes are associated with cycles in money and credit aggregates.
Borio and Lowe (2002) show that sustained rapid credit growth combined with large
rises in asset prices increases the probability of ﬁnancial instability. Adalid and Detken
(2007) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2007) ﬁnd evidence that liquidity shocks play a
more important role in explaining real residential property prices during aggregate asset
4price booms using a panel of respectively 18 and 17 industrialized countries. We conﬁrm
these ﬁndings based on a pure time-series approach. However, while Adalid and Detken
(2007) observe a weaker impact on consumer price inﬂation in boom periods, our results
indicate the opposite. Another relevant element for the interaction is the role of ﬁnancial
deregulation. For instance, Borio (2006) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2007) argue that
ﬁnancial liberalization can strengthen the link between liquidity and asset prices. The
latter has empirically also been conﬁrmed by Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994) and
Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004) who ﬁnd that the responsiveness of asset prices
to credit increases after episodes of ﬁnancial deregulation. If ﬁnancial liberalization is
at the origin of a credit boom, then this ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed by our results, i.e.
we ﬁnd a greater impact on several types of asset prices and economic activity during
a credit expansion. Finally, the results could also be linked to the ﬁnancial accelerator
literature (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) or other theories predicting nonlinearities in the
impact of monetary policy, e.g. the existence of a convex aggregate supply curve. More
speciﬁcally, these theories predict stronger eﬀects of restrictive monetary policy actions
on economic activity and a stronger impact during recessions. The former has empirically
been conﬁrmed for the US by Cover (1992), while the latter has been shown by Peersman
and Smets (2002, 2005) for the Euro area economy. In this paper, on the one hand, we
also ﬁnd support for a stronger impact of negative liquidity shocks, not only on economic
activity but also on real asset prices. On the other hand, real GDP reacts also more to
liquidity shocks during recessions and during periods of tight monetary policy. As a result,
our ﬁndings can also be reconciled with the existence of a ﬁnancial accelerator.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we identify excess
liquidity shocks in a benchmark structural VAR for the Euro area and describe their impact
on diﬀerent types of asset prices and some other relevant macroeconomic variables. We
also make a distinction between the sources of increased liquidity. Section 3 extends the
b e n c h m a r km o d e lt oat i m e - v a r y i n gf r a m e w o r k .I np a r t i c u l a r ,aV A Rw i t has a m p l es p l i t
around the beginning of the Great Moderation and a Bayesian VAR with time-varying
parameters and stochastic volatility are estimated and discussed. To gain further insights
into the sources of time variation and the state dependence, we perform some additional
estimations using a single-equation approach in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
52 The impact of liquidity shocks in the Euro area
2.1 Benchmark VAR
We ﬁrst investigate the macroeconomic consequences of excess liquidity or exogenous
shocks to liquidity.3 Excess liquidity is typically deﬁned as unusually high money growth
with reference to price stability in the long run. Potential indicators are the real and
nominal money gaps, monetary overhang or money/credit to GDP ratios. To avoid en-
dogeneity of money and asset prices with respect to the business cycle, we prefer to use
vector autoregressions. With this approach, it is possible to identify exogenous liquidity
shocks which are not related to endogenous developments due to business or asset price
cycles. As a result, these shocks or the accumulation thereof, can be interpreted as "excess
liquidity". Vector autoregressions have been very popular to identify the impact of mon-
etary policy shocks (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999 for the US, Peersman
and Smets 2003 and Peersman 2004 for the Euro area), but little evidence is available
for liquidity disturbances, in particular for the Euro area. Our model has much in com-
mon with the panel speciﬁcations used by Adalid and Detken (2007) and Goodhart and
Hofmann (2007). More speciﬁcally, the benchmark VAR has the following representation:
Yt = Ct + B(L)Yt−1 + ut (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables containing real GDP, HICP consumer prices,
the short-term nominal interest rate, a real asset price index and the broad monetary
aggregate M3. The VAR is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences, except for the interest rate which
remains in levels, for the sample period 1971Q1-2005Q4 with three lags.4 We consider
three diﬀerent indices of asset prices, namely property prices, equity prices and an index
which is a weighted average of diﬀerent types of asset prices constructed by the BIS
(labeled as aggregate asset prices). Original data are from Borio, Kennedy and Prowse
(1994) and are widely used in other papers. A detailed explanation of the construction of
these indices for the Euro area can be found in the data appendix. Ct is a matrix with
exogenous variables. For the benchmark speciﬁcation, this matrix contains two separate
constants for respectively 1971-1984 and 1985-2005. This is the only way to capture the
3For a detailed description of the diﬀerent transmission channels of liquidity to output and inﬂation,
and in particular the role of asset prices, we refer to Mishkin (1996).
4The lag length is determined with the usual battery of selection criteria. The dataset itself starts
in 1970Q1. A full description of the data is provided in Appendix A. The ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation is
selected to be consistent with the time-varying parameters speciﬁcation of section 3.2, for which stationarity
of all variables is required. Qualitatively consistent results are found for a log-level speciﬁcation which
allows for cointegration relationships among the variables.
6shift in growth rates for some of the variables, e.g. inﬂation, money growth and asset
price inﬂation, observed in the "Great Inﬂation" and "Great Moderation" periods which
would otherwise aﬀect the identiﬁed shocks.5 Another problem we encountered during
the analysis, especially for the speciﬁcation with equity prices and M3-M1 in section 2.2,
regards the inﬂuence of portfolio shifts due to e.g. macroeconomic uncertainty. These
shifts and their unwinding are typically very asymmetric and/or nonlinear (Fischer et
al. 2008). Consider, for instance, increased uncertainty because of a ﬁnancial crisis. As
a consequence, investors quickly substitute their risky assets with safer, capital-certain
assets included in M3. Once ﬁnancial conditions are back to normal however, portfolios
are reversed but much more slowly. Since we will allow equity prices (and aggregate
a s s e tp r i c e s )t oh a v ea ni m m e d i a t ee ﬀect on money in the VAR, this should in principle be
captured by the estimated coeﬃcient for this (average) contemporaneous impact. However,
given the asymmetric and nonlinear nature of such events compared to normal (average)
times, such portfolio shifts are often wrongly identiﬁed as exogenous liquidity shocks. As
a result, a puzzling, signiﬁcantly negative impact of shocks to liquidity on asset prices is
found, in particular for equity prices and shocks to the M3-M1 component of broad money.6
To capture these portfolio shifts, we add a world ﬁnancial market volatility index to the
exogenous block of the VAR which is constructed with data from Gerlach, Ramaswamy
and Scatigna (2006).7 In addition, to capture the nonlinearity, we allow this measure to
have a diﬀerent coeﬃcient depending on a regime of high (above average) or low (below
average) volatility. Estimations were also done by adding a commodity price index and
US variables to the exogenous block but this did not inﬂuence the results. We therefore
decided to drop these variables to gain degrees of freedom.
To identify a liquidity shock, we follow Adalid and Detken (2007) and Goodhart and
Hofmann (2007) by using a standard Choleski decomposition with the broad monetary
aggregate ordered last.8 More speciﬁcally, we assume an immediate impact of all the
other variables in the VAR system on the money aggregate and only a lagged eﬀect of an
exogenous liquidity shock on the other variables. Although this approach could somewhat
underestimate actual shocks to liquidity, it guarantees that all endogenous movements
5Results are not sensitive to alternative split points backward or forward in time.
6Portfolio shifts are a phenomenon typically related to equity prices. The estimated impact on property
p r i c e ss e e m st ob eh a r d l ya ﬀected by it. It is also less of a problem for M1, because the destination of the
switches is typically the interest-bearing component M3-M1. However, the estimated impact for aggregate
asset prices and M3 are obviously also biased.
7See Appendix A for the exact construction of this index.
8Adalid and Detken (2007) order money second to last, before the real eﬀective exchange rate, for a set
of countries. We have excluded the latter variable in our estimations because it does not aﬀect the results
for a relatively closed economy like the Euro area.
7with respect to the macroeconomy are ﬁltered out which is the best way to measure
the economic consequences. As such, the identiﬁed shock can be labeled as an "excess"
liquidity shock. We do not take a stance on the underlying source of the liquidity shock.
This could be monetary policy, but note that the shock is identiﬁed as being orthogonal
to central bank interest rate decisions. In particular, we consider more or less liquidity
in circulation relative to an equilibrium value determined by the interest rate and other
macroeconomic variables.9 Since we use a broad money aggregate, the source could also
relate to shifts in the money multiplier, other developments in the ﬁnancial sector such as
ﬁnancial deregulation, or portfolio shifts between diﬀerent categories of assets by economic
agents.
The benchmark results are shown in Figure 1. This graph displays the eﬀects of a
one-standard-deviation shock in liquidity together with 16th and 84th percentiles error
bands. Responses for the conventional variables are shown for the speciﬁcation with
aggregate asset prices. Separate estimations were carried out for a speciﬁcation where
the aggregate asset price index is replaced by respectively the residential property and
equity price indices. For the latter two, we only report their own responses. Responses
for nominal asset prices are derived from the responses of real asset prices and consumer
prices. While the contemporaneous impact of a typical liquidity shock on M3 is only 0.37
percent, the long-run change of this broad monetary aggregate is around 1 percent and
only realized after approximately 3-4 years. Accordingly, it takes time before portfolios are
fully adjusted. Consistent with expectations, this shock has a temporary positive eﬀect on
economic activity with a peak of 0.3 percent after 6 quarters. Inﬂationary consequences
last for about 3 years resulting in a total increase in the price level by somewhat less than
0.6 percent. The latter implies that the ﬁnal impact is less than proportional, which leads
to a permanent increase in the real money stock by 0.5 percent. To stabilize the economy,
monetary policy increases the nominal interest rate by more than the rise in inﬂation. A
positive shock to liquidity boosts both nominal and real asset prices and their individual
components. The impact on real asset prices is temporary and reaches a maximum of
respectively 0.5, 2.0 and 1.0 percent for property, equity and aggregate asset prices.
Figure 2 shows the time series of the liquidity shocks and their historical contributions
to a number of economic variables for the benchmark VAR. It turns out that liquidity
shocks occurred mostly in clusters, perhaps as a result of periods of ﬁnancial innovation
or deregulation. We observe a series of positive liquidity shocks in the early 1970s having,
by the mid-1970s, an accumulated impact on M3 of more than 6 percent. Also the period
1986-1994 is characterized by rising excess liquidity accumulating to 7 percent in total.
9This measure is thus comparable to a monetary overhang indicator.
8Other shorter periods of increasing liquidity were 1980-1982 and the more recent period
starting in 2004. The latter turning point is actually exactly the moment when the ECB
started to worry about money growth (Fischer et al. 2008). Inbetween these periods,
liquidity shocks were mainly negative and made a negative contribution to M3. Striking
is the period 1994-2004, when there was a negative contribution to the total money stock
of 10 percent, an average reduction of 1 percent per year. The rises and falls of liquidity
obviously had signiﬁcant consequences for inﬂation, economic activity and asset prices
during these periods. For instance, average inﬂation was much higher in the ﬁrst part of
the 1970s, reaching values of 0.4 percent on a quarter-to-quarter basis. On the other hand,
negative shocks to liquidity had a signiﬁcant downward eﬀect on inﬂation during most of
the 1990s, but also on output and asset price growth in the ﬁrst part of the 1990s. In sum,
liquidity shocks were economically very important over the past 35 years.
2.2 Distinction between shocks to M1, M3-M1 and credit
In its monetary analysis, the ECB pays a lot of attention to the components and coun-
terparts of M3. On the one hand, shifts in the more liquid components are considered
as increases in the transaction demand for money and often judged to be indicative of
growing risks to price stability. On the other hand, interest-bearing components of M3,
e.g. money market funds, can be regarded as alternative assets in a portfolio of investors
which are not necessarily used for increased spending. On the counterpart of the balance
sheet, M3 growth driven by credit expansion also signals increased spending, while a shift
in net external assets could reﬂect portfolio shifts at times of increased global uncertainty.
To analyze this into more detail, we also estimated the VARs by replacing broad money
with its respective components M1 and M3-M1 and with total credit.10 Results are shown
in Figure 3. To make a comparison possible, we have normalized the impulse responses
as a 1 percent liquidity increase in the long run. We notice some striking diﬀerences. A 1
percent long-run rise in M1 is almost fully reﬂected in additional inﬂation, i.e. there is no
statistically signiﬁcant long-run eﬀect on real money holdings. In contrast, a shock to M3-
M1 has a persistent impact on the real money stock whereas the price level rises by hardly
0.3 percent. This conﬁrms our supposition that a shock in M3-M1 is more likely to be the
result of a preference shift with respect to asset holdings and does not necessarily lead to
increased spending. In fact, we observe only a small increase in economic activity which
10For total credit, data is only available from 1980 onwards. The results reported in the ﬁgures are
based on a backward extrapolation using M3 for the 1970s. Very similar results, however, are found if we
conduct the estimations for credit only for the sample period 1980-2005.
9is just about one third of the output increase following a similar shock to M1. Portfolio
adjustments are also much slower for M3-M1. While the maximum impact on M1 occurs
almost instantaneously, the immediate impact on M3-M1 is only one third of its long-run
eﬀect. The reaction of asset prices is less clear. On the one hand, we observe a very similar
impact of both components on real property prices. On the other hand, the impact on
real equity prices, and as a consequence also aggregate asset prices, of a shock originating
in M1 is much stronger. The reaction of real equity prices to a shock in M3-M1 is not
even signiﬁcant. One potential explanation could be that portfolio shifts, as described in
section 2.1, are still not fully captured by our volatility index which could underestimate
the actual impact.
With regard to the impact of shocks to credit, we observe very little diﬀerences com-
pared to shocks in M3. The eﬀect of a 1 percent long-run increase in credit on inﬂation is
the same. We only observe a stronger impact on economic activity reaching a maximum of
0.6 percent, compared to 0.3 percent for M3. The reaction of real asset prices is somewhat
stronger which is mainly driven by a stronger impact on real equity prices.
3T i m e - v a r y i n g e ﬀects of liquidity shocks in the Euro area
3.1 A simple sample split
As a ﬁrst check for time variation, we re-estimate the benchmark VAR for two sub-samples,
i.e. 1971Q1-1984Q4 and 1985Q1-2005Q4. As a breakpoint for the sample split, we select
the mid-1980s. This is also the period where Gerlach (2004) detects a break in the forecast-
ing performance of money for inﬂation. In addition, this period is also often characterized
as the end of the "Great Inﬂation" period and the beginning of the "Great Moderation".
One popular explanation for this change in regime is improved and more credible monetary
policy. It is therefore likely that more credible monetary policy could aﬀect the impact of
shocks to liquidity.11
Impulse response functions normalized for a long-run increase in the nominal money
stock of 1 percent are shown in Figure 4. Responses for the ﬁrst sub-sample are dotted
red lines whereas those for the second sub-sample are full black lines. We ﬁnd some
interesting diﬀerences across both periods. Consider the responses of nominal and real
money. We observe a much faster reaction to an excess liquidity shock in the ﬁrst part of
the sample, while portfolios adjust more slowly in the second part of the sample. However,
11The results of this section are not sensitive to changes in the exact breakpoint for the sample split.
VARs for both sub-samples are estimated with two lags instead of three for the whole sample period.
10in contrast to the pre-1985 period, the shift of real money in the latter period is permanent.
As a consequence, the impact on inﬂation and the price level was much stronger before
1985. During that period, any rise in liquidity was proportionally reﬂected in increased
prices. Since the start of the Great Moderation, increased liquidity has a pass-through to
prices which is only one fourth of the rise in money. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
break found by Gerlach (2004). Output eﬀects are also substantially diﬀerent across both
periods. There is a strong eﬀect before 1985 which becomes insigniﬁcant thereafter. For
real property prices, we ﬁnd little diﬀerences across both periods. For real equity prices
and aggregate asset prices, however, we do ﬁnd a much stronger impact during the second
part of the sample. Real aggregate asset prices did not even react signiﬁcantly before
1985, which is driven by a negative eﬀect on real equity prices. This negative reaction is
puzzling and unexpected.
While our sample split does provide more information about the impact of liquidity
shocks under two diﬀerent regimes, such a split is based on the assumption that the break
occurs simultaneously in all the relationships captured by the model which is rather un-
likely. In the next section, we therefore model time variation more properly by estimating
a Bayesian VAR with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility.
3.2 A Bayesian VAR with time-varying parameters
Structural changes in the economy, like the process of building up credibility by the mone-
tary authority and ongoing ﬁnancial innovations and deregulations which supposedly have
contributed to a change in the way the economy experiences excess liquidity shocks, are
more gradual in nature. Consequently, a sample split is not the most appropriate tool
to represent such an evolutionary process. Moreover, such a split does also not capture
state-dependent liquidity eﬀects which could vary within subsamples. Thus, to allow for
the possibility of smooth transitions, we extend our benchmark VAR to a VAR(p) model
with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility in the spirit of Cogley and Sargent
(2002, 2005), Primiceri (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007):
Yt = Ct + B1,tyt−1 + ... + Bp,tyt−p + ut (2)
where Yt is an 5×1 vector of observed endogenous variables as in our benchmark speciﬁca-
tion, Ct is an 5×3 matrix of time-varying parameters that multiplies deterministic terms,12
12These terms correspond to the block of exogenous variables in the benchmark VAR. We include a
constant and the volatility indicators as deterministic variables. Since we estimate the model with time-
varying parameters, two constants and a volatility measure which depends on the volatility level are not
needed.
11Bp,t are 5×5 matrices of time-varying coeﬃcients on the lags of the endogenous variables
where the number of lags is set to p =2 ,a n dut are heteroscedastic reduced-form inno-
vations with a time-varying variance covariance matrix Ωt. The drifting coeﬃcients are
meant to capture possible nonlinearities or time variation in the lag structure of the model.
The multivariate time-varying variance covariance matrix allows for heteroskedasticity of
the shocks and time variation in the simultaneous relationships between the variables in
the system. Even though there is no presumption for changes in the volatility of excess liq-
uidity shocks, ignoring heteroskedasticity of the disturbance terms could lead to ﬁctitious
dynamics in the VAR coeﬃcients, i.e. movements originating from the heteroskedastic
covariance structure would be picked up by the VAR coeﬃcients leading to an upward
bias (Cogley and Sargent 2005). Thus, allowing for time variation in both the coeﬃcients
and the variance covariance matrix, leaves it up to the data to determine whether the
time variation of the linear structure derives from changes in the size of the shock and its
contemporaneous impact (impulse) or from changes in the propagation mechanism (re-
sponse). We estimate this model using Bayesian methods. Technical details regarding the
model setup, the prior speciﬁcations, the estimation strategy (Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm) and the computation of impulse responses are provided in Appendix B.
Figure 5 displays the median impulse responses of nominal and real M3 to a typical
one-standard-deviation excess liquidity shock for horizons up to 28 quarters at each point
in time spanning the period 1978Q4 to 2005Q4.13 The estimated responses have been
accumulated and are shown in levels. There is striking evidence of time variation in the
dynamic responses of both monetary aggregates but their evolutionary patterns diﬀer
considerably. While the contemporaneous impact of an excess liquidity shock on nominal
M3 is surprisingly constant over time, the long-run eﬀect exhibits substantial time variation
with an increasing trend over time. In contrast to the gradually stronger long-run responses
of the nominal money stock, the pattern of responses of real M3 to an excess liquidity
shock is characterized by alternating periods of stronger and weaker reactions over the
whole sample period. The magnitude of the real money responses provides the degree of
pass-through of additional liquidity into consumer prices with permanent increases in real
money holdings corresponding to periods of low pass-through to inﬂation. As emerges
from the graph, the pass-through to consumer prices has been most incomplete during the
periods 1990-1995 and 1999-2001.
13The 3D graphs of the time-varying impulse responses are to be read in the following way: along the
x-axis the starting quarters are aligned from 1978Q4 to 2005Q4, on the y-axis the quarters after the shock
are displayed, and on the z-axis the value of the response is shown in percent. The estimation results only
start in 1978Q3 because we need the ﬁr s t8y e a r sa sat r a i n i n gs a m p l et oi n i t i a t et h ep r i o r s .
12In order to evaluate the changes over time as a result of a 1% increase in liquidity in
the long term, we have also normalized the responses of all endogenous variables on the
long-run eﬀect on nominal M3. These normalized time-varying median impulse responses
for the macroeconomic variables and the diﬀerent asset price indices are shown in Figure
6. To make comparisons with the sample split, note that impulse responses in these graphs
only start in late 1978 since we need the ﬁrst 8 years as a training sample to calibrate
the priors. The ﬁrst responses can therefore be considered as being close to the average
of the period 1970-1978. While output eﬀects have been decreasing gradually from the
early 1980s until the end of the century, since the 2000s this trend is reverting back to
stronger responses of economic activity. A similar picture emerges for the responses of
prices. At the beginning of the sample, which is still heavily inﬂuenced by developments
during the 1970s, excess liquidity is almost fully reﬂected in additional inﬂation with a
negligible long-run eﬀect on the real money stock. Over time the pass-through has become
more and more incomplete reaching its lowest level during the early 1990s. However,
the inﬂationary eﬀects of shocks to liquidity recently follow again an upward trend i.e.
additional liquidity increasingly translates into inﬂation in more recent times. The mirror
image of this evolution is depicted in the responses of real M3 which attained a peak in
the early 1990s and declined continuously ever since. The monetary authority appears
to react preemptively by raising the short-term interest rate in response to increased
liquidity anticipating possible inﬂationary pressures since the responses closely track those
of consumer prices. Apart from greater real money holdings, more pronounced responses
are also observed in real aggregate asset and property prices at around the same time
implying that additional liquidity is directed towards ﬁnancial and physical assets. Since
nominal aggregate asset and property prices are the result of the responses of consumer
prices and real asset and property prices, not much change is observed over time due to
the fact that the movements in these components tend to compensate each other. Median
time-varying impulse responses for equity prices show a puzzling pattern, with even a
negative long-run impact on nominal equity prices. However, in contrast to aggregate
asset and property prices, these responses are statistically insigniﬁcant since the 16th and
84th percentiles are extremely wide. It seems that a white noise variable like equity price
growth cannot be captured by a TVP-BVAR. As a robustness check and an alternative
way to allow for a gradual evolution of the reactions to excess liquidity shocks, we also
recursively estimated the benchmark VARs and qualitatively similar results were found.14
The time-varying responses to excess liquidity shocks provide a much more detailed
picture in comparison to the sample split but we are not yet able to tell in how far the
14These results are available upon request.
13stronger and milder responses over time are dependent upon the business cycle, asset
price boom-bust episodes, the stance of monetary policy and the process of ﬁnancial
liberalization, all of which might be conducive to altering the dynamics of excess liquidity
shocks on the Euro area economy and asset prices. The next section analyses this in more
detail.
4 Liquidity shocks and the state of the economy
4.1 A single-equation approach
We now perform a more formal analysis to investigate whether the impact of liquidity
shocks depends on the underlying state of the economy. We consider ﬁve regimes which
could play a role for the strength of the impact. To determine these regimes, some con-
ventional measures obtained from the literature are used, which will be discussed in the
next subsection.15 Ideally, a full VAR which allows for diﬀerent parameters in each state
is estimated. This is done, for instance, by Balke (2000), Atanasova (2003), and Calza and
Sousa (2005). However, these studies only consider two regimes which are respectively low
and high credit growth. Since we want to investigate the impact for ﬁve regimes simulta-
neously, this approach is not appropriate due to overparameterization of the model. We
therefore use a much simpler framework which allows us to combine several regimes at the
same time and still leaves us with enough degrees of freedom to estimate the model. More
speciﬁcally, we consider the following single equations:
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Equation (3) estimates the average impact of a liquidity shock in the sample across all
states, which could be used as a benchmark. More speciﬁcally, the dependent variable ∆yt
15Some graphs containing the underlying time series that we use to determine the states and additional
information about the construction of the proxies can be found in Figure 1A and Appendix A. We ﬁnd
qualitatively similar results if we use proxies obtained with alternative ﬁlters, indicators or threshold values.
T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
14is respectively output growth, inﬂation, nominal and real aggregate asset price growth,
nominal and real property price growth and, nominal and real equity price growth. Ct is
a matrix containing the exogenous variables which were also included in the benchmark
VAR. In addition, this matrix also includes four lags of the other structural shocks obtained
by the recursive identiﬁcation in the VAR system and, ε
liq
t−i is the estimated liquidity shock
from the VAR at time t − i. For all estimations reported in this section, we have used
four lags of the dependent variables and the liquidity shocks. The results for the average
impact on respectively output growth, inﬂation and the nominal and real growth rates for
property, equity and aggregate asset prices are reported in the ﬁrst row of Table 1. The
ﬁgures in the table are the sums of the coeﬃcients for lags 1 to 4, together with standard
errors between parentheses. Consistent with the VAR estimations, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive impact on all variables under consideration. The magnitudes of the impact can
be used to make comparisons in all further estimations.
The role of the state of the economy is captured by equations (4) and (5), where the
liquidity shocks are interacted with the underlying regimes. Speciﬁcally, ﬁve states are
considered simultaneously, where state
j




γj,i represents the additional eﬀect (positive or negative) of a liquidity
shock in state j compared to the impact of not being in this state. We introduce all ﬁve
states jointly in the estimations because many states are overlapping. For instance, an
economic boom is very likely to occur at the same time as an inﬂation boom and can
even result in an asset price boom. The data then determine the exact driving factors.
Since liquidity shocks are identiﬁed with a recursive ordering in the VAR, these shocks also
have only a lagged impact on respectively output, prices and all asset prices in the single
equations. This fact helps avoid an endogeneity problem for the accompanying underlying
state variable. In particular, the state of the economy is only interacted with the liquidity
shocks for the periods t − 1 until t − 4 in equation (4). This representation implicitly
assumes that the impact of a liquidity shock on the macroeconomic variables depends on
the regime at the moment of the shock. For example, the impact of a shock at t − 3
on output growth at t depends on the state of the economy at t − 3.A sa na l t e r n a t i v e ,
represented by equation (5), we also estimate the impact of (lagged) liquidity shocks, but
the impact now depends on the "current" state of the economy. Speciﬁcally, the impact
is estimated for a liquidity shock at t − i on e.g. output growth between t − 1 and t
depending on the state of the economy at t−1.T a k i n gt−1 still guarantees that there is
no endogeneity problem. There is no a priori theoretical reason to prefer speciﬁcation (4)
or (5).
154.2 Results
Estimation results for both speciﬁcations are reported in respectively the second and third
block of Table 1. In the next subsections, we examine one by one all individual states which
could aﬀect the impact of liquidity shocks and the measures we have used to proxy these
states in more detail.
Asset price booms and busts. There is a growing literature demonstrating that the
eﬀects of liquidity shocks, in particular for asset prices, are greater during asset price
booms and busts compared to normal times. For instance, Herring and Wachter (2003)
describe several features of the banking sector responsible for a credit expansion process
taking place during asset price booms. First of all, increases in asset prices during booms
augment the value of banks’ capital, to the extent that they own assets themselves, thus
making banks more willing to hold loans (the so-called bank capital channel). Secondly, in
boom times, the market value of collateral on outstanding loans will rise, thereby reducing
the risk for banks of suﬀering losses on their existing asset portfolio and accordingly rais-
ing the possibility to lend more without an increased probability of bankruptcy. Finally,
two behavioral characteristics, which are present in the banking sector, explain why banks
underestimate the risks of large concentrations of lending: (a) disaster myopia leads banks
to underestimate the probability of low-frequency economic shocks, causing them to mis-
judge the true probability of a bust in asset prices; (b) perverse provisions, such as the
availability of an oﬃcial safety net to protect the economic system against the contagious
collapse of a bank or the existence of deposit insurance, weaken creditors’ and depositors’
incentives to discipline banks’ risk-taking behavior so that banks will take on more risky
lending than they would in the absence of a safety net. The leverage targeting theory by
Adrian and Shin (2008) contains an alternative explanation that could justify a tighter
link between liquidity measures and asset prices during booms or busts. In a boom, rising
asset prices strengthen banks’ balance sheets, as a result of which banks’ leverage falls.
When banks target a certain leverage ratio, they want to increase their liabilities by bor-
rowing more to buy new assets with these proceeds, thereby inducing further asset price
rises, which will reignite the whole process. The exact same mechanisms will work in a
comparable manner during busts.
The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) reinforces these ef-
fects. As agents can proﬁt from higher collateral values, which reduce asymmetric infor-
mation and moral hazard problems, banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries will grant
even more and cheaper access to credit. This process can result in mutually reinforcing
16cycles in asset prices and credit which exert an inﬂuence on consumption, investment, out-
put and inﬂation via conventional transmission channels. The eﬀect on economic activity
even further aggravates the total impact by aﬀecting the net worth of ﬁrms which also
inﬂuences their access to credit. This leads us to expect a stronger link between liquidity
and asset prices during asset price booms or busts compared to normal periods. As a
result, output and inﬂation consequences should also be stronger.
A greater impact of liquidity shocks during asset price booms (not busts) has been
conﬁrmed in the recent empirical literature by Adalid and Detken (2007) and Goodhart
and Hofmann (2007) using panel estimations for respectively 18 and 17 OECD countries.
In contrast to these studies, we conduct a pure time-series approach for the Euro area
and we also consider the eﬀect on equity and aggregate asset prices. Following Adalid and
Detken (2007), we deﬁne an asset price boom as a period in which the real aggregate asset
price index exceeds its trend by more than 10 percent for at least 3 consecutive quarters.
The trend is estimated using a very smooth recursive HP-ﬁlter (λ = 100000)t a k i n gi n t o
account only data available at the time. For the Euro area, this results in two periods of
asset price booms of 25 quarters in total, i.e. 1987Q3-1991Q2 and 1999Q1-2001Q1.
The results in Table 1 (ﬁrst line of second and third block for our two baseline spec-
iﬁcations) indicate that the impact of liquidity shocks is considerably stronger during
asset price booms. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant, greater eﬀect on economic activity,
inﬂation and real aggregate asset prices. A stronger impact, however, is statistically not
conﬁrmed for the property price component, and for equity prices only for the speciﬁcation
where the impact depends on the current state of the economy. The larger eﬀects are also
economically very relevant, as can be deduced from the size of the estimated coeﬃcients.
To illustrate this even better, Figure 7 shows simulations for the impact of a typical liquid-
ity shock using the speciﬁcation where the impact depends on the state of the economy at
the time of the shock. The black lines represent the average impact of a liquidity shock in
the sample period, when no diﬀerences across states are allowed for, i.e. equation (3). The
red lines are the estimated eﬀects during an asset price boom. We notice that the impact
on the price level and output is almost double in an asset price boom compared to the
average eﬀect.16 For real asset prices, we even ﬁnd an impact which is three times as large
as the average impact. From an economic and policy point of view, these diﬀerences are
enormous. This does not mean that excess liquidity necessarily causes asset price booms,
but any positive shock to liquidity during such a period seriously aggravates the boom.
Moreover, such a shock results in signiﬁcantly increased economic activity and inﬂation.
16Note that the average impact also contains periods of asset price booms. Accordingly, the diﬀerences
relative to a state of not being in an asset price boom is even much larger.
17The latter is somewhat in contrast to Adalid and Detken (2007), who ﬁnd that inﬂation
reacts less to liquidity shocks during asset price booms.
As an alternative indicator for aggregate asset price booms, we also consider the own
cycles of property and equity prices as the underlying regime. To do so, we estimate
exactly the same speciﬁcations, but now we replace the dummy for aggregate asset price
booms with a dummy for the own cycle of respectively property and equity prices. Since
this hardly aﬀects the estimated coeﬃcients for the other states in the regressions, we only
report the coeﬃcients of the newly added regimes. In principle, what should matter for
increasing collateral values, is the cycle of aggregate asset prices. We nevertheless perform
this check to see whether there are diﬀerences. As illustrated in the data appendix, booms
in aggregate asset prices, especially their turning points, do not always fully correspond
to booms in the individual components. For property prices, this makes no diﬀerence, we
still ﬁnd insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. For equity prices, we ﬁnd improved signiﬁcance (but a
smaller coeﬃcient) for the speciﬁcation with the state at the time of the shock, but the
opposite for the current state speciﬁcation which makes it hard to draw any additional
conclusions in relation to the own cycles of the asset price components.
As a second alternative, we substitute the asset price boom regime with an asset price
bust regime. The latter is deﬁned as a period where the real asset price index is more
than 5 percent below its trend for at least three quarters.17 Remarkably, we also ﬁnd an
increased responsiveness of economic activity and asset prices to liquidity shocks. We now
even observe a considerable additional impact on (real) property prices. This implies that
the mechanism is present in both directions, especially in extreme conditions.18
The business cycle. The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is a popular explanation for
a stronger impact of several types of fundamental shocks (including liquidity shocks) on
output, asset and consumer prices in recessions compared to expansions. During economic
downturns, the stronger dependence of ﬁrms and households on external ﬁnancing and the
already low collateral and cash-ﬂow values, will worsen the impact due to increased infor-
mational and moral hazard problems and additional credit rationing. In economic booms
on the other hand, the balance sheets of economic agents are solid, creditworthiness is
high and ﬁrms and households can largely provide their own ﬁnancing, which signiﬁcantly
17W h i l ew ed e ﬁne 10% above trend as an asset prices boom, we take only 5% below trend as a threshold
for a bust because there were only 5 quarters during which asset prices were more than 10% below trend in
our sample. For the 5% criterion, we ﬁnd a long-lasting bust between 1993Q1-1996Q4 and another shorter
one for the period 2002Q3-2003Q2.
18Not surprisingly, the size of the coeﬃcients (and statistical signiﬁcance) become even larger when both
asset price booms and busts are included in the same estimation, results which are not presented.
18reduces the eﬀect of liquidity shocks on asset and consumer prices as well as economic
activity (Bernanke and Gertler 1989). Models that are based on the existence of a con-
vex short-run aggregate supply curve also predict a weaker impact on economic activity,
whereas the inﬂationary eﬀects should be stronger.19 Convexity implies that the slope of
the supply curve is steeper at higher levels of output and inﬂation than at lower levels.
As a result, shifts in aggregate demand driven by changes in liquidity will have a smaller
impact on output and a larger eﬀect on inﬂation in an expansion, while the reverse occurs
in a recession. Since it is costly and diﬃcult to adjust housing supply, especially upwards
due to adjustment costs and other constraints that retard an increase in the housing stock,
a similar reasoning can be made for property prices. A convex short-run supply curve of
properties predicts stronger eﬀects of liquidity shocks on real asset prices when housing
demand outpaces the supply of additional housing, which is typically the case in an eco-
nomic boom. For equity prices, however, supply is probably much less constrained which
makes an asymmetric impact less likely.
For the Euro area, Peersman and Smets (2002) present evidence which shows that the
output eﬀects of monetary policy shocks are signiﬁcantly stronger at times of low economic
growth compared to periods of high growth. Furthermore, at least part of this asymmetry
can be explained by the existence of a ﬁnancial accelerator (Peersman and Smets 2005).
In our estimations, the economy is considered as being in an economic boom whenever
actual real GDP growth is above its trend for at least 3 quarters. The trend is estimated
using a standard HP-ﬁlter (λ = 1600).
Also the state of the business cycle matters for the impact of a liquidity shock. First,
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly smaller eﬀect on economic activity, but not on inﬂation, during an
economic boom. The latter could be the result of both channels cancelling each other out.
Second, the impact on nominal and real property prices is substantially stronger at times
of an economic boom. Accordingly, the eﬀect of convex supply is probably dominating the
ﬁnancial accelerator channel in the housing market. The property price reaction during
economic expansions is estimated to be twice the average one (see Figure 7). In contrast,
such an upward constraint is less binding for the supply of equity since we do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between recessions and booms.
Financial deregulation and liberalization. Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004)
explain how the liberalization of the banking sector strengthens the ﬁnancial accelerator
19Several classes of models give rise to a convex short-run aggregate supply curve, e.g. models based on
capacity constraints, the presence of menu costs and theories based on downward rigidity of wages as in
the so-called insider-outsider theory of employment. See Peersman and Smets (2002) for an overview.
19channel. Improvements in banking-sector competition due to ﬁnancial deregulation are of-
ten accompanied by the liberalization of capital and stock markets. As a result, the safest
segment of borrowers shifts away from the banking sector towards the stock market when
in need of new capital. The search for new customers leads banks to smaller and riskier
borrowers, which increases the importance of collateral values as a monitoring tool. Calza,
Monacelli and Stracca (2006) show that ﬁnancial liberalization in mortgage markets can
also reinforce the balance sheet channel. Consequently, ﬁnancial deregulation ampliﬁes
the importance of collateral values for lending decisions and thus the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism, leading to a stronger eﬀect of excess liquidity on asset prices. Allen and Gale
(2000) describe another mechanism that creates a link between liquidity and asset prices
following periods of ﬁnancial liberalization. Their model demonstrates that uncertainty
about the extent of credit expansion can increase the magnitude of an asset price bubble,
thus introducing a role for credit in the formation of asset price bubbles. Periods of ﬁnan-
cial liberalization are typically associated with high uncertainty about credit expansion,
thereby establishing a link between liquidity and asset prices during episodes of ﬁnancial
deregulation.
Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994) ﬁnd that real asset prices become more responsive
in countries that underwent ﬁnancial-sector liberalization. The existence of this channel
is also conﬁrmed by Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004) who show that real prop-
erty prices gain importance in explaining real bank lending growth in the aftermath of
ﬁnancial deregulation. Furthermore, Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2006) ﬁnd that the
correlation between consumption and house prices is higher in countries with more liber-
alized mortgage markets. We consider a credit boom as a proxy for ﬁnancial liberalization.
We assume that periods of ﬁnancial liberalization or deregulation will result in credit and
money expansions relative to economic activity. More speciﬁcally, a credit boom is deﬁned
as a period of minimum 3 quarters in which the money/GDP ratio grows faster than its
trend.20 The latter is also determined by an HP-ﬁlter (λ = 1600).
When the economy is in a regime where money/credit to GDP grows faster than its
trend, we observe a signiﬁcantly increased responsiveness of output growth and all types
of asset prices for both speciﬁcations. Somewhat surprisingly, we only ﬁnd a stronger
reaction for inﬂation in a credit boom when we model the impact to be dependent on the
current state of the economy. The additional impact is also economically important, as
illustrated in Figure 7. Relative to the average impact, all diﬀerent types of asset prices
react almost twice as much in a regime of credit expansion. For output, the additional
20A better proxy would be the credit/GDP ratio but credit data are only available from 1980 onwards.
The correlation with money/GDP for the overlapping sample is, however, quite high.
20impact is approximately one third of the average impact.
The fourth panel of Table 1 also shows the results for regimes of rising cumulative excess
liquidity. For this estimation, we replace the credit boom regime indicator with a state in
which the historical contribution of liquidity shocks to M3 (see section 2.1) is rising for at
least three consecutive quarters, the underlying idea being that e.g. ﬁnancial innovations
will result in a series of positive liquidity shocks. In contrast to the money/credit to GDP
ratio, any endogenous reaction of money to the interest rate and asset prices is ﬁltered out.
Also for this measure we ﬁnd very similar results, i.e. an increased impact on the economy
during periods of ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation seems to be a robust ﬁnding.
Inﬂation regimes. Borio and Lowe (2002) and Borio (2006) argue that improved central
bank credibility has anchored the public’s inﬂation expectations, which could potentially
dampen the eﬀect of liquidity shocks on inﬂation, a reasoning which can be put into
the much broader literature on the Great Inﬂation and Great Moderation. Part of this
literature attributes the post-1985 stable and low inﬂation environment to improved and
more credible monetary policy. In such an environment, however, excess liquidity could
instead translate into higher asset prices. In addition, increased economic globalization
has also supported central bank credibility and has put downward pressure on prices. The
more intense international competition which also stimulates economic growth, could in
turn have boosted asset prices. In a similar fashion, Borio and Lowe (2002) further argue
that improvements deriving from the supply side have had comparable eﬀects on inﬂation
and asset prices. All of these arguments suggest that a low inﬂation environment is likely
to be associated with a stronger link between liquidity and asset prices on the one hand
and a weaker relationship between liquidity and inﬂation on the other hand.
We deﬁne an inﬂation boom as a period in which inﬂation is higher than its trend value
for a minimum of 3 quarters. Again, the trend is calculated using an HP-ﬁlter (λ = 1600).
Our evidence suggests that it is not possible to draw ﬁrm conclusions with respect to
the inﬂation regime. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly stronger impact for real property prices and,
to a lesser extent, for real equity and aggregate asset prices for the speciﬁcation where
the impact depends on the inﬂation regime at the time of the shock. However, when we
consider the impact of a liquidity shock being dependent on the current inﬂation regime,
the results are not robust anymore. No asymmetries are found for any type of asset prices,
and for output growth we now even ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly weaker eﬀect.
Monetary policy stance and positive versus negative liquidity shocks. Another
nonlinear propagator of the ﬁnancial accelerator is related to liquidity or credit constraints.
21The intuition is that in a regime where economic agents are more liquidity constrained,
any shock to the economy should have larger eﬀects on investment and spending which
is not the case in a regime of loose credit conditions. Liquidity constraints are typically
related to the balance-sheet position of ﬁrms. When balance sheets are weak, the net
worth of ﬁrms is low and their ability to borrow is limited. Conversely, when the net
worth is high and balance sheets are strong, balance-sheet considerations tend to be less
important when ﬁrms seek funding for investments. The above described asymmetry for
the business cycle is a good example. In recessions, the net worth is low and economic
agents are more liquidity constrained compared to an expansion, resulting in a stronger
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. However, there are other situations in which liquidity
constraints become more binding. One popular example is the monetary policy stance. In
periods of restrictive monetary policy, balance sheets will be weaker resulting in lower net
worth and tighter liquidity constraints. As a consequence, the propagation of exogenous
shocks to the economy will be stronger, including liquidity shocks. The opposite is true
in situations of loose monetary policy.
In the estimations, restrictive monetary policy stance is a dummy equal to one for each
quarter in which the actual interest rate is higher than the interest rate obtained from a
Taylor rule. Output and inﬂation gaps are calculated as described above and the neutral
real interest rate is computed with an HP-ﬁlter (λ = 1600). The coeﬃcients for the reaction
to output gap and inﬂation in the interest rate rule are both set to 0.5. We ﬁnd little
support for the proposition. Only in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly stronger
impact on economic activity and weak evidence for an increased reaction of nominal and
real asset prices. This evidence however, is not conﬁrmed for the speciﬁcation where the
impact depends on the current state of the economy, i.e. the additional reaction of output
growth, nominal and real asset prices becomes insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, both
speciﬁcations show a signiﬁcantly weaker eﬀect of liquidity shocks on inﬂation at times
of tight monetary policy. Perhaps, this might be explained by increased credibility of
monetary policy with respect to inﬂation during these periods. As shown in Figure 7, the
economic relevance of the reduced pass-through is however rather small.
The same mechanism predicts greater eﬀects of negative shocks to liquidity compared
to positive liquidity shocks. Negative shocks will make the credit constraints more binding
and reduce the net worth of ﬁrms resulting in a stronger ﬁnancial accelerator, whereas
positive shocks relax the constraint leading to a weaker balance sheet channel. On the
other hand, a convex short-run aggregate supply curve also predicts stronger output eﬀects
of negative liquidity shocks relative to positive ones, but smaller eﬀects on inﬂation. Cover
(1992) does not ﬁnd an eﬀect of positive money supply shocks on US output, while negative
22shocks signiﬁcantly reduce economic activity. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) show that a
ﬁnancial accelerator is stronger after restrictive monetary policy shocks. The ﬁnal row
of Table 1 makes a distinction between negative and positive liquidity shocks.21 There
is a signiﬁcant additional output eﬀect of a liquidity shock in case the shock is negative
conﬁrming the existing evidence. In addition, we also ﬁnd a considerably larger eﬀect on
all types of asset prices, something which has not been documented before. For inﬂation,
no asymmetry is found, which is probably due to both channels cancelling each other out.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated how the dynamic eﬀects of liquidity shocks on economic
activity, asset prices and inﬂation diﬀer over time. We ﬁnd strong evidence that the impact
depends on the source of increased liquidity and the underlying state of the economy. More
speciﬁcally, when the source of increased liquidity is a rise in M1, the impact on economic
activity is very strong and the ultimate pass-through to inﬂation is proportional. In
contrast, when the rise in liquidity originates in M3-M1, there is only a small reaction of
economic activity and the pass-through to inﬂation is only one third of the rise in money.
Such a shock rather results in a permanent rise of real money holdings. When we compare
shocks to M3 with shocks to its counterpart, credit, we notice very similar reactions of the
main macroeconomic variables. The only diﬀerence is a stronger rise in economic activity
following a credit expansion.
We also ﬁnd substantial time variation in the impact of liquidity shocks. When we
consider the Great Inﬂation and the Great Moderation as two diﬀerent regimes, we ﬁnd
a complete pass-through to inﬂation and a strong output reaction before 1985, whereas
in the post-1985 period the impact on inﬂation is rather subdued and the output eﬀects
are insigniﬁcant. However, when we extend the analysis to a more sophisticated Bayesian
VAR with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility, we observe increases in the
impact of liquidity shocks during some periods and decreases during other periods.
Using a single-equation approach where we allow the impact of liquidity shocks to
depend on the state of the economy, we are able to shed more light on the observed time
variation. In particular, we ﬁnd support for the fact that the impact of a liquidity shock
on economic activity becomes stronger when the underlying economy is characterized by
an extreme state of asset prices, i.e. during asset price booms or busts, but also during a
21Here the monetary policy stance regime is replaced with a dummy which is equal to one in case of a
negative liquidity shock.
23credit boom, when the business cycle is in a recession or when the monetary policy stance
is restrictive. On the other hand, inﬂationary eﬀects are larger during an asset price boom
as well as a credit boom. Also the impact of shocks to liquidity on asset prices strongly
depends on the state of the economy. The eﬀects are much stronger in booms and busts
of the asset price cycle, when the business cycle is in an expansion, during a credit boom
and slightly stronger at times of tight monetary policy. In addition, we also ﬁnd evidence
that negative shocks to liquidity have a stronger impact on economic activity and asset
prices than positive liquidity shocks. All these types of asymmetries are also economically
very relevant.
For the European Central Bank, this paper should help to monitor the signals oﬀered by
the monetary analysis. A broadly based assessment of the sources of increased liquidity is a
ﬁrst requirement to determine the exact consequences for economic activity and inﬂation.
However, the accompanying state of the economy is also very important to predict the
eﬀects of shifts in money. This requires an analysis which goes beyond pure monetary and
ﬁnancial variables. More speciﬁcally, the interaction with the outcome of its other pillar,
the economic analysis, turns out to be very relevant to make accurate predictions.
24AD a t a a p p e n d i x
A.1 Sources and construction of variables
Asset Prices. Asset price data have been kindly provided by Steve Arthur and Claudio
Borio of the BIS. The construction of the BIS asset price indices is extensively described in
Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994). The aggregate asset price index consists of residential
property prices, commercial property prices and equity prices, where each component is
weighted according to its importance in the economy. The weight on each sub-index
is infrequently updated over time. The three sub-indices and the aggregate index are
available on a quarterly basis from 1970Q1 to 2006Q4 for 18 OECD countries, among
which are the following Euro area countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands and Finland. We have constructed a Euro area aggregate for the
equity price, residential property price and aggregate asset price index by applying the 1995
PPP-weights for the EU12, which are also used to compile the updated Area Wide Model
data (ECB 2005). Since the BIS asset price data are not available for all Euro area member
countries, we have rescaled the original EU12-weights. The total sum of the 1995 PPP-
weights of the Euro area member countries for which the asset price data are available,
amounts to 91,8%. For the ﬁrst year of the sample, data on Spanish residential property
prices are missing and aggregate asset price data are lacking for the following countries
and periods: Spain, 1970Q1-1970Q4; Italy and Belgium, 2005Q1-2006Q4. Whenever asset
price data are incomplete, we have rescaled the original EU12-weights and computed the
asset price index using these new weights. In order to keep the asset price series consistent,
we have applied the growth rates of this newly weighted asset price index to extrapolate
the originally weighted asset price index whenever observations were missing.
Real GDP, HICP and the short-term nominal interest rate. Real GDP, HICP
and short-term interest rate data for the Euro area have been collected from the updated
Area Wide Model (AWM) dataset for the period 1970Q1-2005Q4. The short-term nominal
interest rate in the AWM dataset is the three-month Interbank Oﬀered interest rate.
Monetary Aggregates. Non-seasonally adjusted data for the monetary aggregates M3
and M1 have been retrieved from the ECB website (series code for M3: BSI.M.U2.N.V.M30.
X.I.U2.2300.Z01.E; for M1: BSI.M.U2.N.V.M10.X.I.U2.2300.Z01.E). These series are
available on a monthly basis and represent indices of notional stocks. Seasonal adjustment
has been carried out by means of the Census X-12 method in EViews 6. Quarterly data
25on M3 and M1 have been compiled by taking averages of the monthly observations. M3
minus M1 data have been constructed using series for M3 and M1, which are expressed as
outstanding amounts at the end of each period (stocks), in millions of euro. The monthly
data series for M3 and M1, seasonally and working day adjusted, have been downloaded
from the ECB website (series code for M3: BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E; for
M1: BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M10.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E). The monthly observations for both series
have been averaged over the quarter and then the quarterly M1 series has been subtracted
from the M3 series, resulting in a new data series for M3 minus M1. Outliers in this
constructed series (more speciﬁcally, in 1990Q3 (German reuniﬁcation), 1999Q1 (start of
stage three of EMU), 2001Q1 (entry of Greece to the Euro area), 2005Q2 and 2005Q3)
have been corrected for by applying the growth rate of the index of notional stocks of M3
(see above) to the series for M3 minus M1 in these speciﬁc quarters.
Volatility of Stocks and Bonds. Monthly data on the volatility of stocks and bonds
have been kindly provided by Stefan Gerlach, Srichander Ramaswamy and Michela Scatigna.
For a detailed description of how these volatility series have been compiled, we refer the
reader to Gerlach, Ramaswamy and Scatigna (2006). In order to obtain a proxy for world
ﬁnancial market volatility for both types of markets, we have aggregated the stock and
bond market volatility data for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the US and the
UK by applying the 1995 PPP-weights for each country. The resulting world ﬁnancial mar-
ket volatility index has been converted to quarterly frequency by taking monthly averages
to span the period 1970Q1-2005Q4.
A.2 Construction of the indicators
Asset price booms. Following Adalid and Detken (2007), we extract the trend com-
ponent of real aggregate asset prices, residential property prices and equity prices by
recursively estimating a one-sided HP-ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of λ = 100000.
After an initial (non-recursive) estimate over 20 quarters, the recursive trends were derived
by adding one observation period by period so as to take only information into account
which was available at each point in time. Deviations from trend that exceed a threshold
of 10 percent for at least three consecutive quarters are characterized as an asset price
boom. For an equity price boom, the threshold is set to 20 percent, while the 10 percent
threshold is kept to identify housing booms. Three consecutive periods in which real asset
prices are more than 5 percent below trend are identiﬁed as asset price busts. The original
time series and the accompanying states are shown in Figure 1A.
26Economic boom. To derive the output gap we apply an ex-post HP-ﬁlter over the
whole sample period with λ = 1600 to extract trend growth of real GDP. An economic
boom is deﬁned as a period of above trend growth for a minimum of three quarters.
Credit boom. A standard HP-ﬁlter with λ = 1600 is applied to the ratio of nominal
M3 over nominal GDP to determine its trend growth for the entire sample. A period of
at least three consecutive quarters in which the money/GDP ratio grows faster than its
trend is considered a credit boom.
Inﬂation boom. The inﬂation gap is computed as the deviation of inﬂation from its
HP-trend (λ =1 6 0 0 ). Above average growth of inﬂation for at least three quarters is
classiﬁed as an inﬂation boom.
Monetary policy stance. Following Detken and Smets (2004), we determine the mon-
etary policy stance by computing the Taylor gap as deviations of the nominal interest rate
i from the Taylor rule interest rate: it − [r∗
t + πt +0 .5(πt − π∗
t)+0 .5(yt − y∗
t)],w h e r er∗
is the trend value of the real interest rate obtained from applying a standard HP-ﬁlter
(λ = 1600) to the diﬀerence between the nominal short-term interest rate and current
inﬂation and the coeﬃcients on the output and inﬂation gaps (calculated as described
above) are ﬁxed at 0.5.
B A Bayesian SVAR with time-varying parameters and sto-
chastic volatility
Model setup. The observation equation of our state space model is
Yt = X0
tθt + ut (6)
where Yt is a 5×1 vector of observations of the dependent variables, Xt is a matrix includ-
ing lags of all the dependent variables, an intercept and data on two deterministic terms
(the volatility measures), and θt is a 5(5p+3)×1 vector of states which contains the lagged
coeﬃcients and the parameters of the deterministic variables. The ut of the measurement
equation are heteroskedastic disturbance terms with zero mean and a time-varying co-







At is a lower triangular matrix that models the contemporaneous interactions among the
27endogenous variables and Ht is a diagonal matrix which contains the stochastic volatilities:
At =
⎡




α31,t α32,t 10 0
α41,t α42,t α43,t 10
α51,t α52,t α53,t α54,t 1
⎤












⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(7)
Let αt be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At (stacked by
rows) and ht be the vector containing the diagonal elements of Ht. Following Primiceri
(2005), the three driving processes of the system are postulated to evolve as follows:
θt = θt−1 + νt νt ∼ N (0,Q) (8)
αt = αt−1 + ζt ζt ∼ N(0,S) (9)
lnhi,t =l n hi,t−1 + σiηi,t ηi,t ∼ N(0,1) (10)
The time-varying parameters θt and αt are modeled as driftless random walks.22 The
elements of the vector of volatilities ht =[ h1,t,h 2,t,h 3,t,h 4,t,h 5,t]
0 are assumed to evolve
as geometric random walks independent of each other.23 T h ee r r o rt e r m so ft h et h r e e
transition equations are independent of each other and of the innovations of the observation
equation. In addition, we impose a block-diagonal structure for S of the following form:





S1 01x2 01x3 01x4
02x1 S2 02x3 02x4
03x1 03x2 S3 03x4























so that the covariance states can be estimated equation by equation.24
22As has been pointed out by Primiceri (2005), the random walk assumption has the desirable property
of focusing on permanent parameter shifts and reducing the number of parameters to be estimated.
23Stochastic volatility models are typically used to infer values for unobservable conditional volatilities.
The main advantage of modelling the heteroskedastic structure of the innovation variances by a stochastic
volatility model as opposed to the more common GARCH speciﬁcation lies in its parsimony and the
independence of conditional variance and conditional mean. Put diﬀerently, changes in the dependent
variable are driven by two diﬀerent random variables since the conditional mean and the conditional
variance evolve separately. Implicit in the random walk assumption is the view that the volatilities evolve
smoothly.
24As has been shown by Primiceri (2005, Appendix D), this assumption can be easily relaxed.
28Prior distributions and initial values. The priors for the initial states of the re-
gression coeﬃcients, the covariances and the log volatilities, p(θ0), p(α0) and p(lnh0)
respectively, are assumed to be normally distributed, independent of each other and in-
dependent of the hyperparameters. The priors are calibrated on the point estimates of a
constant-coeﬃcient VAR(2) estimated over the period 1970-1978.
We set θ0 ∼ N
h
b θOLS, b POLS
i
where b θOLS corresponds to the OLS point estimates




.W i t h
regard to the prior speciﬁcation of α0 and h0 we follow Primiceri (2005) and Benati
and Mumtaz (2007). Let P = AD1/2 be the Choleski factor of the time-invariant vari-
ance covariance matrix b ΣOLS of the reduced-form innovations from the estimation of the
ﬁxed-coeﬃcient VAR(2), where A is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diago-
nal and D1/2 denotes a diagonal matrix whose elements are the standard deviations of
the residuals. Then the prior for the log volatilities is set to lnh0 ∼ N (lnμ0,10 × I5)
where μ0 is a vector that contains the diagonal elements of D1/2 squared and the vari-
ance covariance matrix is arbitrarily set to ten times the identity matrix to make the
prior only weakly informative. The prior for the contemporaneous interrelations is set to
α0 ∼ N
h
e α0, e V (e α0)
i
, where the prior mean for α0 is obtained by taking the inverse of A
and stacking the elements below the diagonal row by row in a vector in the following way:
e α0 =[ e α0,21, e α0,31, e α0,32, e α0,41, e α0,42, e α0,43, e α0,51, e α0,52, e α0,53, e α0,54]
0. The covariance matrix,
e V (e α0), is assumed to be diagonal with each diagonal element arbitrarily set to ten times
the absolute value of the corresponding element in e α0. While this scaling is obviously
arbitrary, it accounts for the relative magnitude of the elements in e α0 as has been noted
by Benati and Mumtaz (2007).
With regard to the hyperparameters, we make the following assumptions along the
lines of Benati and Mumtaz (2007). We postulate that Q follows an inverted Wishart





,w h e r eT0 are the prior degrees of freedom which are
set equal to the minimum value allowed for the prior to be proper, T0 =d i m ( θt)+1 .
Following Cogley and Sargent (2002), we adopt a relatively conservative prior for the time
variation in the parameters setting the scale matrix to Q =( 0 .01)





by the prior degrees of freedom. This is a weakly informative prior and the particular
choice for its starting value is not expected to inﬂuence the results substantially since the
prior is soon to be dominated by the sample information as time moves forward adding
more time variation. The four blocks of S are postulated to follow inverted Wishart
distributions, with the prior degrees of freedom set equal to the minimum value required

























. As for the scale matrices, they are calibrated on the absolute values of
the respective elements in e α0 as in Benati and Mumtaz (2007). Given the univariate feature
of the law of motion of the stochastic volatilities, the variances of the innovations to the
univariate stochastic volatility equations are drawn from an inverse Gamma distribution








MCMC algorithm (Metropolis within Gibbs sampler): Simulating the Poste-
rior Distribution. Since sampling from the joint posterior is complicated, we simulate
the posterior distribution by sequentially drawing from the conditional posterior of the
four blocks of parameters: the coeﬃcients θT, the simultaneous relations AT,t h ev a r i -
ances HT, where the superscript T refers to the whole sample, and the hyperparameters
collectively referred to as V . Posteriors for each block of the Gibbs sampler are conditional
on the observed data Y T and the rest of the parameters drawn at previous steps.
Step 1: Drawing coeﬃcient states
Conditional on AT, HT, V and Y T, the measurement equation is linear and has
Gaussian innovations with known variance. Therefore, the conditional posterior is a prod-
uct of Gaussian densities and θTcan be drawn using a standard simulation smoother (see




θT | Y T,A T,HT¢
= p
¡




θt | θt+1,YT,A T,HT¢
From the terminal state of the forward Kalman ﬁlter, the backward recursions produce
the required smoothed draws which take the information of the whole sample into account.
More speciﬁcally, the last iteration of the ﬁlter provides the conditional mean θT|T and
variance PT|T of the posterior distribution. A draw from this distribution provides the
input for the backward recursion at T − 1 and so on until the beginning of the sample
according to:
θt|t+1 = θt|t + Pt|tP−1
t+1|t (θt+1 − θt)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP−1
t+1|tPt|t
Following Primiceri (2005) we do not impose a stability constraint on the draws ob-
tained from the unconstrained normal distributions for the coeﬃcient vector, i.e. we are
not ruling out explosive behavior for our VAR since little posterior probability is associated
with such a behavior.
Step 2: Drawing covariance states
30Similarly, the posterior of ATconditional on θT, HT,a n dY T is a product of normal
densities and can be calculated by applying the same algorithm as in step 1 thanks to
the block diagonal structure of the variance covariance matrix S.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, a
system of unrelated regressions based on the following relation: Atut = εt,w h e r eεt are
orthogonalized innovations with known time-varying variance Ht and ut = yt − X0
tθt are
observable residuals, can be estimated to recover AT a c c o r d i n gt ot h ef o l l o w i n gt r a n s f o r m e d
equations where the residuals are independent standard normal:


























































































































Step 3: Drawing volatility states
Conditional on θT,A T, and Y T, the orthogonalized innovations εt ≡ At (yt − X0
tθt),
with Va r(εt)=Ht, are observable. However, drawing from the conditional posterior of
HT is more involved because the conditional state-space representation for lnhi,t is not
Gaussian. The log-normal prior on the volatility parameters is common in the stochastic
volatility literature but such a prior is not conjugate. Following Cogley and Sargent
(2005, Appendix B.2.5) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007) we apply the univariate algorithm
by Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994) that draws the volatility states hi,t o n ea tat i m e . 25
Step 4: Drawing hyperparameters
The hyperparameters of the model can be drawn directly from their respective posterior
distributions since the disturbance terms of the transition equations are observable given
θT,A T,HT and Y T.
We perform 50,000 iterations of the Bayesian Gibbs sampler but keep only every 10th
draw in order to mitigate the autocorrelation among the draws. After a "burn-in" pe-
riod of 50,000 iterations, the sequence of draws of the four blocks from their respec-
tive conditional posteriors converges to a sample from the joint posterior distribution
25As opposed to Primiceri (2005) who uses the method proposed by Kim, Shephard and Chib (1998)
which consists of transforming the non-Gaussian state-space form into an approximately Gaussian one by
using a discrete mixture of normals. This linear transformation then allows to apply a standard simulation
smoother conditional on a member of the mixture.
31p
¡
θT,A T,HT,V | Y T¢
. We have performed the usual set of convergence test (see Prim-
iceri 2005; Benati and Mumtaz 2007) to ensure that our chain has converged to the ergodic
distribution. In total, we collect 5000 simulated values from the Gibbs chain on which we
base our structural analysis.
Impulse responses. Here we describe the Monte Carlo integration procedure we use
to compute the path of structural impulse response functions to an excess liquidity shock.
In the spirit of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) we compute the generalized impulse
responses as the diﬀerence between two conditional expectations with and without the
exogenous shock:
IRFt+k = E [yt+k | εt,ωt] − E [yt+k | ωt]
where yt+k contains the forecasts of the endogenous variables at horizon k, ωt represents
the current information set and εt is the current disturbance term. At each point in time
the information set we condition upon contains the actual values of the lagged endoge-
nous variables and a random draw of the model parameters and hyperparameters. More
speciﬁcally, in order to calculate the conditional expectations we simulate the model in
the following way: We randomly draw one possible state of the economy at time t from
the Gibbs sampler output represented by the time-varying lagged coeﬃcients and the el-
ements of the variance covariance matrix. Starting from this random draw from the joint
posterior including hyperparameters, we stochastically simulate the future paths of the
coeﬃcient vector as well as the (components of the) variance covariance matrix based on
the transition laws for 28 quarters into the future.26 By projecting the evolution of the
system into the future in this way, we account for all the potential sources of uncertainty
deriving from the additive innovations, variations in the lagged coeﬃcients and changes in
the contemporaneous relations among the variables in the system.
Since we are identifying the excess liquidity shock as the only shock that does not have a
contemporaneous eﬀect on the other variables in the system, we compute the time-varying




t = chol(Ωt). Given this contemporaneous
impact matrix, we compute the reduced-form innovations based on the relationship ut =
B0,tεt,w h e r eεt contains ﬁve structural shocks obtained by drawing from a standard
26Alternatively, one could compute impulse responses based on the set of coeﬃcients drawn from the
Gibbs sampler at time t, i.e. assuming the parameters of the model to be ﬁxed for horizon k over which
one wants to study the dynamics of the system (see Primiceri 2005). In other words, one investigates the
propagation of the shock given the present structure of the economy. Since this approach is closest to the
exercises performed in Section 2.1 and 3.1, we have calculated impulse responses also in this way but there
was no discernible diﬀerence in the results.
32normal distribution. Impulse responses are then computed by comparing the eﬀects of
a shock on the evolution of the endogenous variables to the benchmark case without
shock, where in the former case the shock is set to εi,t +1 , while in the latter we only
consider εi,t. The reason for this is to allow the system to be hit by other shocks during
the propagation of the shock of interest. For each point in time, we randomly draw 500
current states of the economy which provide the distribution of impulse responses taking
into account possible developments of the structure of the economy. The representative
impulse response function for each variable at each date is the median of this distribution.
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38Figure 1: Benchmark model - Impulse responses to a liquidity shock (M3)
Note: sample period 1971Q1-2005Q4, separate estimations for asset, property and equity prices

































































































0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28Figure 2: Historical contributions of liquidity shocks (M3)
Note: benchmark model, separate estimations for asset, property and equity prices
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1971Q1 1976Q1 1981Q1 1986Q1 1991Q1 1996Q1 2001Q1 2006Q1Figure 3: Impulse responses for a 1% long-run increase in M1, M3-M1 and credit
Note: sample period 1971Q1-2005Q4, separate estimations for asset, property and equity prices
         median of the posterior together with 16th and 84th percentiles
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0 4 8 1 21 62 02 42 8Figure 4: Sample split - Impulse responses for a 1% long-run increase in M3
Note: sample periods are respectively 1971Q1-1984Q4 (red dotted lines) and 1985Q1-2005Q4 (black full lines), 























































































































0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28Figure 5: Time-varying median impulse responses of nominal and real M3 after a one-standard-deviation excess liquidity shock 
 







































 Figure 6: Time-varying median impulse responses for a 1% long-run increase in M3 
 






































































 Figure 6 continued: Time-varying median impulse responses for a 1% long-run increase in M3 





































































































 Figure 7: Single equations - Responses to a one standard deviation liquidity shock (baseline specification)
Note: "average" is the average impact for the whole sample period not allowing for differences across states, "apboom" is the impact in an asset prices boom, "cycle" in an economic boom,
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average apboom cycle credit inflation policyFigure 1A: Indicators
Source: Bank of International Settlements
Note: the left-hand scale refers to aggregate asset prices and property prices, 
the right-hand scale to equity prices



































































1971Q1 1974Q4 1978Q3 1982Q2 1986Q1 1989Q4 1993Q3 1997Q2 2001Q1 2004Q4
timeTable 1: Single equation estimations
nominal real nominal real nominal real
Average impact across all states
0.071 (0.010) 0.082 (0.013) 0.274 (0.089) 0.117 (0.041) 0.179 (0.061) 0.095 (0.033) 0.927 (0.155) 0.680 (0.108)
Impact depending on state at time of shock
asset prices boom 0.053 (0.021) 0.058 (0.021) 0.136 (0.190) 0.227 (0.103) -0.069 (0.173) -0.078 (0.074) 0.325 (0.313) 0.629 (0.621)
economic boom -0.070 (0.026) -0.006 (0.023) 0.306 (0.242) -0.108 (0.116) 0.556 (0.168) 0.298 (0.080) 0.340 (0.514) -0.089 (0.338)
credit boom 0.058 (0.023) -0.009 (0.024) 0.462 (0.279) 0.154 (0.149) 0.363 (0.172) 0.257 (0.084) 0.922 (0.526) 0.975 (0.347)
inflation boom -0.018 (0.025) -0.001 (0.020) 0.631 (0.196) 0.095 (0.099) 0.461 (0.127) 0.258 (0.080) 1.168 (0.329) 0.473 (0.286)
restrictive monetary policy stance 0.031 (0.017) -0.028 (0.017) 0.343 (0.186) 0.123 (0.106) 0.015 (0.128) -0.021 (0.064) 0.150 (0.362) 0.028 (0.292)
Impact depending on current state
asset prices boom 0.018 (0.023) 0.093 (0.023) 0.429 (0.241) 0.230 (0.112) -0.011 (0.189) -0.085 (0.083) 0.473 (0.413) 0.537 (0.289)
economic boom -0.036 (0.026) -0.004 (0.023) 0.100 (0.217) 0.072 (0.104) 0.350 (0.161) 0.329 (0.089) -0.061 (0.487) 0.339 (0.360)
credit boom 0.046 (0.022) 0.035 (0.019) 0.403 (0.247) 0.292 (0.127) 0.303 (0.157) 0.249 (0.072) 0.897 (0.505) 1.130 (0.313)
inflation boom -0.047 (0.020) -0.006 (0.015) 0.051 (0.180) 0.022 (0.113) -0.084 (0.171) 0.002 (0.088) -0.430 (0.402) -0.127 (0.294)
restrictive monetary policy stance -0.009 (0.018) -0.036 (0.015) -0.080 (0.180) 0.034 (0.088) -0.186 (0.138) -0.060 (0.058) 0.277 (0.311) -0.129 (0.214)
Alternative regimes
boom in own cycle for PP and EP
impact depending on state at time of shock 0.053 (0.021) 0.058 (0.021) 0.136 (0.190) 0.227 (0.103) -0.023 (0.203) -0.060 (0.073) 0.677 (0.252) 0.345 (0.212)
impact depending on current state 0.018 (0.023) 0.093 (0.023) 0.429 (0.241) 0.230 (0.112) -0.036 (0.189) -0.065 (0.072) 0.034 (0.275) 0.019 (0.236)
asset prices bust
impact depending on state at time of shock 0.026 (0.016) -0.016 (0.015) 0.580 (0.196) 0.250 (0.096) 0.250 (0.134) 0.296 (0.062) 1.118 (0.308) 0.805 (0.251)
impact depending on current state 0.013 (0.022) -0.027 (0.016) 0.013 (0.213) 0.074 (0.104) 0.012 (0.173) 0.192 (0.075) 0.056 (0.409) 0.149 (0.364)
rising cumulative excess liquidity
impact depending on state at time of shock 0.028 (0.024) 0.044 (0.023) 0.589 (0.302) 0.326 (0.149) 0.236 (0.159) 0.134 (0.071) 0.876 (0.532) 1.154 (0.366)
impact depending on current state 0.037 (0.021) -0.010 (0.021) 0.367 (0.270) 0.346 (0.136) 0.197 (0.170) 0.127 (0.074) 0.349 (0.495) 0.830 (0.317)
Negative versus positive liquidity shocks
0.060 (0.039) -0.061 (0.043) 1.229 (0.375) 0.339 (0.190) 0.963 (0.264) 0.346 (0.110) 2.629 (0.592) 1.233 (0.458)
Note: figures are sum of coefficients of additional impact being in the respective state compared to  not being in this state, standard errors between parenthesis
Asset prices growth Property prices growth Equity prices growth Output growth InflationWorking Paper List 2007 
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